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Abstract. Traditional access control models and mechanisms struggle to con-
tain the threats posed by malware and software vulnerabilities as these cannot 
differentiate  between  processes  acting  on  behalf  of  users  and  those  posing 
threats to users’ security as every process executes with the full set of the user's 
privileges. Existing application confinement schemes attempt to address this by 
limiting the actions of particular processes. However, the management of these 
mechanisms requires security-specific expertise which users and administrators 
often do not possess. Further, these models do not scale well to confine the 
large number of applications found on functionality-rich contemporary systems. 
This paper describes how the principles of role-based access control (RBAC) 
can be applied to the problem of restricting an application's behaviour. This ap-
proach provides a more flexible, scalable and easier to manage confinement 
paradigm that requires far less in terms of user expertise than existing schemes. 
Known as functionality-based application confinement (FBAC), this model sig-
nificantly mitigates the usability limitations of existing approaches. We present 
a case study of a Linux-based implementation of FBAC known as FBAC-LSM 
and demonstrate the flexibility and scalability of the FBAC model by analysing 
policies for the confinement of four different web browsers. 
Keywords:  Functionality-Based  Application  Confinement  (FBAC),  Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC), Application-Oriented Access Control, Applica-
tion Confinement, Sandbox, Usable Security, Reusable Policy. 
1   Introduction 
Existing widely used access control models reflect the traditional paradigm of protect-
ing users from one another. Although user-oriented access control models such as tra-
ditional mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary access control (DAC) and 
role-based access control (RBAC) restrict the actions of users, these are generally not 
able to distinguish between an application performing legitimate actions on behalf of a 
user and code that is using these privileges nefariously. As a result, programs are es-
sentially fully trusted: once executed malicious code typically has complete access to 
the user's privileges.  
Application confinement models have been developed to restrict the privileges of 
processes, thereby limiting the ability of these programs to act maliciously. However, established application confinement models that allow finely-grained control over ac-
cess to resources require the construction of extremely complex policies [1, 2]. These 
require significant technical expertise to develop and have limited scalability as con-
fining each application involves the construction of a new detailed policy. Unfortu-
nately, to date this has limited their practical usefulness and acceptance. 
By recognizing that the goal of restricting users is essentially analogous to that of 
restricting applications, it follows that the principles from existing user-oriented ac-
cess control models may be applied to the problem of process confinement. Specifi-
cally, applying the principles of role-based access control to application confinement 
leverages the flexibility and efficient management of RBAC to provide hierarchical 
policy abstractions for restricting applications, which eases policy development and 
association. These constructs can be parameterised to provide flexible and reusable 
application-oriented policy abstractions for improved usability, manageability, scal-
ability and security. 
2   Background 
2.1   Application Confinement 
A  number  of  application  confinement  models  have been developed to provide re-
stricted environments for applications, thereby limiting their ability to behave mali-
ciously.  Some  simply  isolate  programs  to  a  limited  namespace  using  a  traditional 
sandbox [3] or virtual machine [4], examples include chroot(), FreeBSD jails [5] 
Solaris Zones [6], and Danali [7]. Others allow restricted access to selected shared re-
sources, such as the Java [8] and .NET [9] sandboxes where applications are restricted 
by complex administrator-specified policies based on the properties of the code. Some 
models exist based on the paradigm of label-based integrity preservation where sub-
jects are labelled high or low in integrity and the flow of information between levels 
serves as the basis for policy [10, 11]. Other restricted environments require the speci-
fication of a detailed policy detailing each application’s access to specific resources. 
This applies to confinement mechanisms including Janus [12], Systrace [13], Novel 
AppArmour [14] (previously known as SubDomain), TRON [15], POSIX capabilities  
[16], Bitfrost [17], CapDesk [18], and Polaris [19]. Methods of mediating this type of 
access control include using capabilities [20] or system call interposition [2]. Other 
schemes, such as domain and type enforcement (DTE) [21] and the Role Compatibil-
ity model [22] allow the definition of multiple restricted environments, and propagat-
ing processes transition between them. 
Unfortunately all of these mechanisms have limitations and problems. Isolation-
based approaches typically involve significant redundancy as shared resources must 
be duplicated and they also severely limit the ability of applications to exchange data 
with one another [23]. On the other hand, more finely-grained restricted access control 
policies are difficult and time-consuming to define and manage. The task of translat-
ing high level security goals into finely grained policies is problematic, making these 
policies difficult to both construct and verify for completeness and correctness [1, 24]. Furthermore, once constructed an individual policy will apply primarily to only a sin-
gle application, meaning that the work involved in constructing suitable policies for all 
necessary applications is considerable. For example, specifying DTE domain policies 
is complex and although multiple processes can be confined by a single domain, do-
mains must be specified separately [25]. There is significant overlap of privileges 
granted to compiled domain policies, and typically any non-trivial application is as-
signed a separate domain. Finally, specifying file and domain transitions can also be a 
complex task as programs need specific authorisation to label files as being accessible 
to programs in different domains, and users and programs both need permission in or-
der to execute programs belonging in another domain [26]. 
These application confinement schemes lack flexible policy abstractions which can 
allow  application  access  policies  to  be  meaningfully  reused  while  providing  fine 
grained restrictions. With isolation sandboxes the container itself acts as the only pol-
icy  abstraction  –  a  simple  collection  of  subjects  and  resources.  Existing  schemes 
which mediate finely-grained privileges to applications are generally either devoid of 
policy abstraction (a list of privileges are directly associated with a program) or con-
tain large monolithic self-contained abstractions (such as DTE domains or RC roles) 
which cannot be flexibly reused for different applications unless they share the exact 
same privilege requirements. As a result, these application confinement architectures 
do not provide a practical or scaleable solution for conveniently confining multiple 
applications. 
While a few implementations of these models allow policy abstractions to be com-
prised of smaller components they are reduced to a single monolithic policy abstrac-
tion before use, which limits their usefulness at run-time and their reusability. For ex-
ample, SELinux’s DTE Domain specification can include macros in the m4 language. 
Before policy is applied, these are expanded into many lines of rules granting all the 
required privileges. The result is a single domain with a fixed set of privileges, typi-
cally those required by a single program. Likewise, at system start-up abstractions in 
AppArmor application profiles are translated into a raw list of privileges associated 
with the program. This monolithic approach to policy abstraction also means that any 
finer grained abstractions which may have been used to construct policy are not avail-
able when managing the privileges of a process. 
2.2   Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a user-oriented access control model which as-
sociates  users  with  privileges  via  organizational  abstractions  known  as  roles  [27]. 
When a user joins an organisation they are assigned the roles representing the privi-
leges required by their responsibilities and duties and this eliminates the task of manu-
ally assigning permissions to each new user [28]. Access decisions are then made 
based on the permissions associated with the roles the user is assigned. Policy reus-
ability is enhanced through role hierarchies which allow roles to be defined in terms of 
other roles. Also, role constraints such as separation of duty can restrict certain con-
flicting permissions from being associated with the same user (static separation of 
duty) or accessed concurrently (dynamic separation of duty) [29]. Many similarities can be observed between the motivation for the development of 
RBAC in relation to traditional access controls and the current problems faced in the 
domain of application confinement. RBAC provides a conceptually-straightforward, 
scalable and abstract association between users and the privileges they require in order 
to perform their designated duties within an organisation. This highlights the advan-
tages a model which provides similar abstract associations between applications and 
the privileges they require can provide to application-oriented access control. 
3   Functionality-Based Application Confinement 
3.1   Policy Abstraction 
The notional similarities previously noted between user confinement via access con-
trols and application confinement models suggest the applicability of traditional ac-
cess control principles to the problem of restricting applications. In particular, many 
of the design principles of RBAC can be applied to manage the privileges of executing 
programs. Based on this, a model known as functionality-based application confine-
ment (FBAC) has been developed [30]. Designed to be analogous to the specifications 
contained in the NIST/ANSI INCITS RBAC model [31, 32], FBAC acts as an addi-
tional layer above traditional access control models and treats all software that the 
user executes as untrusted by limiting its access to only the resources deemed neces-
sary for the application to operate as required. 
Application  confinement  policies  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  their  behavioural 
classes [33] which are conceptually analogous to RBAC roles. FBAC uses abstrac-
tions similar to RBAC roles and role hierarchies which are used to define complex, 
finely-grained application confinement policies in terms of high level abstractions. 
Consequently applications are confined to those resources deemed necessary by its as-
signed functionalities.  
Functionalities are hierarchical policy abstractions which form the basis of FBAC 
policy. Functionalities can represent high-level behavioural classes of applications (for 
example, “Web_Browser” or “Web_Server”) and these can inherit lower level func-
tionalities that represent application functionality such as “http_client”, “ftp_client” 
and “read_files_in_directory”. These functionalities are associated with privileges that 
are made up of operations on objects.  
The RBAC model and an FBAC confinement are structurally analogous but very 
different in purpose. While RBAC is a user confinement model for system administra-
tors to restrict what permissions users hold according to their duties within an organi-
sation, FBAC is a framework for users to restrict the privileges of each application 
based on the functionality it provides.  
Related to the concept of discretionary role-based access control (DRBAC) [34, 
35] where users have the ability to define and activate their own RBAC roles, FBAC 
also applies RBAC concepts to allow users to confine themselves; however, FBAC is 
focused on restricting applications rather than users.  3.2   Parameterisation 
While RBAC roles are self-contained with each user receiving the same set of privi-
leges [36], in an application confinement context behavioural classes are better de-
fined  in  terms  of  parameterised  categories  [33].  Unlike  RBAC  role  associations, 
FBAC functionality associations are parameterised to allow functionalities to adjust to 
the needs of different applications. For example, although an application may be clas-
sified by a general grouping such as “Web_Server”, in order to create an effective 
confinement policy certain application-specific details (such as the location of files 
and directories it uses) must still be defined.  
FBAC provides parameterised functionalities to allow policies to be more precisely 
defined in terms of application-specific details. FBAC functionalities are passed ar-
guments in a way similar to how subroutines are in programming languages. This al-
lows the policy abstraction to be adapted to the specifics of individual applications 
providing related features. Functionality definitions can also contain default arguments 
which allow further ease of use in common cases without sacrificing flexibility. This 
means applications are defined in terms of functionalities plus any information re-
quired  by  those  functionalities.  Functionalities  may  use  this  information  to  inherit 
from other functionalities or define the resources associated with operations. 
3.3   Mandatory and Discretionary Controls 
Unlike existing application confinement schemes which are either applied as a discre-
tionary control (such as Janus or TRON) or as a mandatory control (such as with DTE 
or AppArmor), FBAC supports both mandatory and discretionary access controls si-
multaneously. Administrators can specify policies which govern the behaviour of ap-
plications to enforce system-wide security goals, restrict users to particular programs, 
and manage user protection. Users may then further confine these applications to pro-
tect their own resources from malicious code. 
This is achieved by layering FBAC confinements. A confinement may apply to 
multiple users and may reuse the functionalities from other confinements. The result-
ing authority granted to an application is the intersection of the confinements for that 
application which apply to the executing user. This layered approach to application 
confinement is unique and provides defence in depth while requiring the maintenance 
of only one mechanism. Because confinements can share the same functionalities this 
greatly reduces the overhead of managing multiple layers of application-oriented ac-
cess controls, while enforcing the security goals of both users and administrators. 
4   Defining and Managing Policy 
The FBAC model greatly simplifies the management of application confinement poli-
cies compared with existing models. Functionalities are established representing the 
various functional requirements of applications. Privileges can be assigned to these 
functionalities directly and may also be inherited by other contained functionalities. The applications have these functionalities associated with them as required by their 
expected behaviour and when the program is executed, this will activate the function-
alities that apply to it and thus define its privileges at runtime. 
Initial policy definition in FBAC involves the creation of new functionalities in 
terms of low level privileges and existing functionalities, assigning the rights neces-
sary for applications to function according to the behaviour described by functional-
ities. This is influenced by security goals and application behaviour and resource re-
quirements.  Although  the  design  of  FBAC significantly reduces the complexity of 
privilege assignment compared with other finely-grained confinement models, this ini-
tial process does require greater expertise than other aspects of the framework and 
may be completed by a trusted third party rather than by end users.  
Once defined these functionalities may be reused by multiple users to restrict as 
many  applications  as  appropriate.  End  users  require  little expertise to identify the 
functionalities relevant to their applications based upon the program's expected behav-
iour.  These  are  then  associated  with  the  application  and  parameters  are  provided 
where necessary. This process is far simpler than with alternative confinement tech-
niques where complex policies must be defined for each individual application. 
5   Web Browser Case Study 
A language for expressing FBAC policies has been developed and a prototype imple-
mentation of the model as a Linux Security Module (LSM) [37] called FBAC-LSM is 
near completion. The policy requirements for a number of applications were analysed 
and a hierarchal FBAC policy for FBAC-LSM has been created. We now present a 
case study of the application of FBAC policies to four common web browsers — Fire-
fox, Opera, Epiphany and Lynx — for the purposes of demonstrating policy flexibility 
and reusability. 
5.1   Restricting Applications 
To confine a web browser such as Firefox using the graphical policy manager tool the 
user simply chooses the high level functionalities relating to that application's func-
tionality.  The  user  assigns  a  base  functionality  such  as  “Stan-
dard_Graphical_Application_Base” and any high level functionalities which describe 
what the application is expected to do (such as the “Web_Browser” functionality as 
defined in Figure 2 and provides application specific parameters such as where the 
program  is  installed,  the  location  of  its  configuration  files,  where  the  program 
downloads files to, and potentially a list of hosts it can connect to. If confining a 
browser such as Opera that supports additional functionality, other corresponding high 
level  functionalities  are  also  assigned  such  as  “Email_Client”,  “Irc_Chat_Client”, 
“News_Reader_Client” and “BitTorrent_Client”. 
Unlike some operating systems where each application's files are typically found in 
a very small number of directories, Linux organises application files based upon the 
filesystem  hierarchy  standard  (FHS).  This  can  lead  to  an  application's  files  being spread throughout the filesystem tree and in some cases parameter value specification 
may necessitate a degree of familiarity with this arrangement. Any complexity due to 
this can be mitigated by the use of parameter descriptions suggesting the location of 
files according to the FHS and the provision of a list of pathnames used by a program 
(for example, as in the case of Opera which provides this information to the user). Fur-
thermore, techniques are currently being developed to automatically derive parameter 
values based on associated functionalities, and package management and filesystem 
analysis. A graphical policy management tool has been created which removes the 
need for end-users to be familiar with the FBAC-LSM policy language and policy as-
sociation becomes a matter of pointing and clicking. However, even so, the FBAC-
LSM policy language is simpler and provides greater abstraction than existing alterna-
tives. 
A FBAC policy for the Firefox browser created with the graphical policy manager 
tool is given in Figure 1. For comparison purposes, additional policies for the three 
other browsers considered in the case study are contained in Appendix A. 
The Firefox policy from Figure 1 begins by specifying the executables which are 
used to run the application (binarypaths). Next it identifies the two functionalities that 
this  application  encompasses:  “Standard_Graphical_Application_Base”  and 
“Web_Browser”. These functionalities are parameterised to address the specifics of 
the application, for example to specify where the various files it uses are located and 
the hosts to which it is permitted to connect. These parameters can easily be changed 
to grant the application access to different resources. For example, to restrict the web 
browser  to  only  connect  to  particular  servers  (such  as  on  an  intranet)  the  al-
lowed_hosts_to_connect_to parameter value can be changed. 
application firefox 
{ 
    binarypaths /usr/bin/firefox:/usr/bin/X11/firefox: 
           /usr/lib/firefox/firefox:/usr/lib/firefox/firefox.sh; 
    functionality Standard_Graphical_Application  
        (peruser_directory="/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/", 
        peruser_files="/home/*/.mozilla/appreg", 
        application_libraries_directory="/usr/lib/firefox/", 
        libraries_fileextension="*.so", 
        config_directory={"/home/*/.mozilla/":"/home/*/.gnome2_private/"}, 
        config_files="", 
        read_only_directory=""); 
    functionality Web_Browser 
        (plugins_and_extensions_directory={"/home/*/.mozilla/plugins/": 
            "/usr/lib/firefox/extensions/": 
            "/usr/lib/browser-plugins/firefox/"}, 
        download_directory={"/home/*/Desktop/":"/home/*/downloads/"}, 
        allowed_hosts_to_connect_to="*", 
        view_web_files_in_directory="/home/**/"); 
} 
Fig. 1. Entire FBAC-LSM policy for Mozilla Firefox 
5.2   Defining Functionalities 
Each high level functionality is made up of lower level functionalities and privileges.  
For example, the “Web_Browser” functionality incorporates many inherited function-
alities including “http_client”, “Ftp_Client” and “Web_Files_Viewer” which are in 
turn made up of other functionalities and direct privileges.  The “Web_Browser” functionality policy shown in Figure 2 is syntactically the 
same as the application policy in the previous figure, with additional concepts such as 
the definition of parameters (followed by their default values), and information for the 
graphical tool. Descriptions of functionalities and parameters assist the user, while the 
granularity  of  the  functionality  (high  or  low  level)  and  a  category  (in  the 
“Web_Browser” case “network_client”) allow the graphical tool to flexibly present 
the policy to the user. Note the scalability of the abstractions provided by the func-
tionalities construct is demonstrated by the fact that the four web browsers considered 
in the case study use the same underlying functionality definition. 
functionality Web_Browser 
{ 
  functionality_description "a web browser, and ftp client"; 
  highlevel; 
  category network_client;   
  parameter plugins_and_extensions_directory  
    "/home/*/.[APPLICATION_NAME]/plugins/"; 
  param_description "the directory the application keeps any app-specific 
  plugins or extensions";   
  parameter download_directory "/home/*/downloads"; 
  param_description "the directories downloads are stored to";   
parameter allowed_hosts_to_connect_to "*"; 
  param_description "hosts the browser can connect to";   
  parameter view_web_files_in_directory "/home/**/"; 
  param_description "view web files in this dir (.htm, .jpg...)";   
  functionality general_network_connectivity_and_file_access ( ); 
  functionality http_client (allowed_hosts_to_connect_to, <default>); 
  functionality save_downloads (download_directory); 
  functionality extensions_plugins (plugins_and_extensions_directory, "*"); 
  functionality mime_aware ( ); 
  functionality web_plugins_and_helpers ( ); 
  functionality Ftp_Client (allowed_hosts_to_connect_to); 
  functionality Web_Files_Viewer (view_web_files_in_directory, <default>); 
} 
Fig. 2. FBAC-LSM web browser functionality definition 
Privileges are low level rights defined as operations on objects, which represent the 
security-related kernel actions which allow access to the resources that are necessary 
for that functionality. Low level functionalities, such as “files_r” in Figure 3, provide 
abstractions to group together related low level privileges. In this functionality the pa-
rameter “files” is used to grant both read and “get attribute” access to these files. 
functionality files_r 
{ 
    functionality_description "read access to these files"; 
    lowlevel; 
    parameter files ""; 
    param_description "allows these files to be accessed as described"; 
    privilege file_read files; 
    privilege file_getattr files; 
} 
Fig. 3. Low level FBAC-LSM functionality and privileges 
The results are policies for these web browsers which enforce the principle of least 
privilege by confining the application to a restricted set of privileges required for the 
application to complete its required duties. Consequently the actions of any malware 
or the effects of any exploited security vulnerability are confined to the behaviour al-
lowed by its functionality-oriented policy.  5.3   Comparison with Other Mechanisms 
The FBAC model has significant advantages over existing systems. A policy to con-
fine  a  complex  application  such  Firefox  using  standard  system  call  interposition 
mechanisms such as Systrace or Janus results in a complex series of low level rules 
specifying which system calls are allowed and under what circumstances. This is illus-
trated by the excerpt from a Systrace policy given in Figure 4 which only represents a 
tiny portion of the complete policy. The resulting policy is generally extremely com-
plex and it is difficult to verify that this policy is in fact correct [38].  
native-fsread: filename eq "/usr/libexec/ld.so" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "/usr/sbin/suexec" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "/var/run/ld.so.hints" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "/var/www" then permit 
native-fsread: filename eq "<non-existent filename>" then deny[enoent] 
Fig. 4. Excerpt from a Systrace policy 
Similarly, managing NSA’s SELinux policy requires expertise beyond that of typi-
cal users or system administrators. Under SELinux the policy which applies is the net 
result of the configuration of multiple access control models (including RBAC, DTE, 
Multi-level Security and User Identity) and can be hard to verify for correctness or 
completeness [1, 39]. For example, Figure 5 demonstrates the complexity and inscru-
tability of a SELinux policy by providing a brief excerpt from an SELinux reference 
policy for Mozilla [40]. Although domains serve as policy abstractions, each applica-
tion is usually assigned a unique domain consisting of complex rules specifying al-
lowed file and domain transitions and interactions with types (similarly labelled ob-
jects). While SELinux is capable of meeting strong confidentiality requirements, it is 
not well suited to end users confining potentially malicious applications [41].  
manage_dirs_pattern($2,$1_mozilla_home_t,$1_mozilla_home_t) 
manage_files_pattern($2,$1_mozilla_home_t,$1_mozilla_home_t) 
manage_lnk_files_pattern($2,$1_mozilla_home_t,$1_mozilla_home_t) 
relabel_dirs_pattern($2,$1_mozilla_home_t,$1_mozilla_home_t) 
relabel_files_pattern($2,$1_mozilla_home_t,$1_mozilla_home_t) 
relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2,$1_mozilla_home_t,$1_mozilla_home_t) 
manage_files_pattern($1_mozilla_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t) 
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_mozilla_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t) 
manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_mozilla_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t) 
manage_sock_files_pattern($1_mozilla_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t) 
fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_mozilla_t,$1_mozilla_tmpfs_t,{ file lnk_file sock_file 
fifo_file }) 
allow $1_mozilla_t $2:process signull; 
domain_auto_trans($2, mozilla_exec_t, $1_mozilla_t) 
# Unrestricted inheritance from the caller. 
allow $2 $1_mozilla_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; 
Fig. 5. Excerpt from Mozilla interface rules in the Tresys SELinux reference policy 
[42] 
Novell’s AppArmor policy specification format lists the resources an application 
may access along with the type of access required [14]. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Although this simplifies policy readability, it exposes the underlying complexity of the 
system. As a result an in-depth knowledge of both the application being confined and 
low-level details of the operating system's shared resources and services are required 
in order to properly review the automatically generated policy. Construction of Ap-pArmor policies typically relies on recording process activity, while FBAC policies 
are constructed based on high level security goals. Further, while AppArmour allows 
collections of access rules to be grouped into abstractions, these are comparatively in-
flexible. For example, unlike AppArmour, FBAC has the ability to disable parts of 
policy on the fly and specify separation of duty, while the parameterised nature of 
FBAC functionalities allows these to be easily adapted to differing application re-
quirements.  
/etc/mailcap r, 
/etc/mime.types r, 
/etc/mozpluggerrc r, 
/etc/opt/gnome/gnome-vfs-*/modules r, 
/etc/opt/gnome/gnome-vfs-*/modules/*.conf r, 
/etc/opt/gnome/pango/* r, 
/etc/opt/kde3/share/applications/mimeinfo.cache r, 
/etc/rpc r, 
/etc/sysconfig/clock r, 
/opt/gnome/lib/GConf/2/gconfd-2 Px, 
/opt/gnome/lib/gnome-vfs-*/modules/*.so mr, 
/opt/gnome/lib/gtk-*/**.so* mr, 
/opt/gnome/lib/lib*so* mr, 
/opt/gnome/lib/pango/**.so mr, 
/opt/gnome/lib64/lib*so* mr,  
Fig. 6. Excerpt from AppArmor's Firefox profile 
MAPbox provides behaviour based application confinement by allowing software 
authors to specify a program's behaviour class which describes generally what the 
program does along with some application-specific parameters [33, 43]. MAPbox’s 
designers identified 14 program classes and corresponding restricted environments are 
associated with applications based on these author-assigned classes. These restricted 
environments are defined by complex finely-grained rules specified by the user. While 
the use of behavioural classes to create an association between policies and programs 
is an important contribution, policy management in MAPbox remains complex for us-
ers. Furthermore applications may only be associated with a single behavioural class 
which is problematic given many contemporary applications provide a variety of func-
tionality; for example, the Opera web browser. Like MAPbox, FBAC also restricts 
applications based upon parameterised classes. However, FBAC allows applications 
to be associated with multiple functionalities and its hierarchical approach to policy 
management supports multiple levels of abstraction, bringing numerous advantages.  
For example, FBAC functionalities may be defined hierarchically whereas MAPbox’s 
sandboxes are defined individually. Unlike MAPbox, FBAC allows users to easily re-
strict arbitrary applications to protect themselves from programs they do not trust. 
Furthermore FBAC-LSM’s use of the LSM interface avoids the problems inherent in 
MAPbox's use of the system call interface as a security layer [38]. 
Generally therefore, in contrast to these mechanisms, FBAC-LSM separates and 
abstracts the task of developing low level policy rules from the task of defining the 
expected behaviour of a specific program. This allows users, administrators and soft-
ware authors — in fact uniquely any combination of authorised policy sources — to 
restrict what an application can do using high level abstractions which can then be eas-
ily fine-tuned via parameterisation to suit different applications. Compared to alterna-
tive finely-grained application confinement models, FBAC may be used to confine 
very complex software packages such web browsers using a hierarchical policy that is far easier to manage. While the above confinement methods are either system wide 
and  mandatory  (SELinux/DTE,  AppArmor)  or  per-user  and  discretionary 
(Janus/Systrace, MAPbox), FBAC-LSM simultaneously enforces mandatory and dis-
cretionary FBAC policies. Under FBAC users can configure their own security policy 
to protect themselves while administrators are able to define system-wide policies to 
protect system security, enforce organisation level security goals and, when necessary, 
administer policy to protect specific users. These restrictions on applications severely 
limit the impact from malware or exploitation of any software vulnerabilities. 
6   Discussion 
6.1   Manageability and Usability 
The policies for the four web browsers presented here (in Figure 1 and Appendix A) 
are defined in terms of high level security goals. In contrast with other application 
confinement schemes such as those previously discussed, FBAC allows succinct high 
level policies to be defined using flexible abstractions. This both reduces and simpli-
fies the management task involved in creating policies to confine individual applica-
tions. The programs are simply identified as web browsers and application specific in-
formation is supplied. In the case of Opera other high level functionalities are also 
specified. The finely grained privileges inherited by functionalities are separated from 
the specification of application policies, thus making policy specification easier than 
with other schemes. The flexibility to restrict applications based on abstract descrip-
tions of what the application can do provides a significant improvement in usability, 
making it easier to translate high level security requirements into finely grained poli-
cies.  
Furthermore, the “Web_Browser” functionality (in Figure 2) demonstrates that the 
hierarchical structure of policies allows functionalities themselves to also be defined 
in terms of abstractions, such as “http_client”. Policies can be reviewed from their 
high level functionalities (such as “Web_Browser” in Figure 2) to lower level detail 
and right down to the privileges specifying permissible operations on designated ob-
jects (such as “file_r” in Figure 3). This makes finely grained policies easier to man-
age and comprehend as the policy is made up of levels of abstractions which can en-
capsulate low-level details. 
6.2   Scalability 
Once functionalities such as “Web_Browser” have been defined, policies for each ap-
plication which provides the described functionality can be defined in terms of these 
constructs. All four web browsers studied reuse the “Web_Browser” policy abstrac-
tion. This leverages the fact that many applications may be categorised into the same 
behavioural classes and can be confined to easily identified sets of privileges required 
for the applications to carry out their intended functions [33]. Rather than confining an 
application by specifying each distinct privilege required, they can be simply defined in terms of the behavioural classes to which they belong. Thus the model scales well 
to confine the numerous applications typically found on contemporary systems. 
The use of functionality hierarchies also increases the scalability of policy man-
agement  by  facilitating  greater  reuse  of  existing  defined  policy.  For  example  the 
“Web_Browser” functionality includes the functionality “Ftp_Client” which itself can 
be used to describe applications which may not be web browsers. The use of hierar-
chies increases abstraction while reducing redundancy. 
6.3   Security 
Using application confinement schemes such as FBAC to limit program privilege pro-
vides significant security improvements over simply relying on user-oriented access 
control mechanisms. FBAC enforces the principle of least privilege by confining ap-
plications to the set of privileges required for them to do their job. Although the ab-
stract nature of functionalities may potentially grant an application more privileges 
than they actually use, in general these additional privileges simply allow the applica-
tion to carry out its authorised tasks in varied ways. 
If an application attempts to exercise privileges it does not hold the request is de-
nied.  For  example,  if  due  to  the  introduction  of  malicious  code  a  restricted  web 
browser attempts to act outside of the behaviour defined by its associated functional-
ities the action would be prevented. This limits the ability of applications to behave 
maliciously whether deliberately or otherwise.  
The underlying FBAC-LSM policy granularity is finely grained and is determined 
by the LSM interface. This design provides scope for the future inclusion of additional 
features such as stateful network packet inspection.  
Compared with other confinement models the FBAC framework provides equiva-
lent security benefits. However, the superior convenience, simplicity, flexibility and 
scalability of the FBAC model makes it far better suited to ubiquitous deployment. 
However, beyond this FBAC has other security advantages. For example, the sepa-
ration of duty feature is unique in the area of application confinement and allows high 
level security policies to specify privileges or functionalities that cannot be exercised 
simultaneously. Static separation of duty prevents conflicting privileges from being 
assigned to the same application while dynamic separation of duty stops applications 
from exercising certain privileges concurrently. This limits the ability of high level se-
curity goals to be accidentally subverted by low-level security policies. 
Also, as FBAC’s policy abstractions are natively hierarchical, parts of the policy 
can be easily activated or deactivated at run time. This is not possible using the exist-
ing application-oriented access control models such as DTE, RC or AppArmor as 
privileges are contained in a monolithic abstraction associated with the security con-
text. FBAC’s hierarchy of functionalities allows run-time intervention to dynamically 
deactivate or activate branches of functionalities. This could be requested by a user, 
administrator or the software itself. For example using a multi-purpose application 
(such as Opera web browser, email, irc, new reader and bittorrent client) the user or 
the application itself may wish to only enable the functionality corresponding to the feature the program is performing. This is equivalent to the concept of an RBAC user 
activating only those roles corresponding to the job he or she is currently performing.  
FBAC also restricts applications based on a combination of policies representing 
the security goals of users and administrators. While existing controls provide either 
mandatory  or  discretionary  application  confinement,  FBAC  provides  both  through 
layers  of  confinements.  Policy  can  be  reused  across  confinements  and  only  one 
mechanism needs to be maintained. 
7   Conclusion 
The case study and corresponding analysis of the FBAC model presented here demon-
strates that applying parameterised RBAC constructs to the problem of application 
confinement can provide clear advantages over alternative approaches. FBAC sepa-
rates the task of policy construction from the association of these policies with specific 
applications. This simplifies the process as users or administrators can assign pre-
specified generic policies based upon an application's anticipated functionality rather 
than needing to construct individual policies for each program. FBAC utilises func-
tionalities as an abstract policy construct and by allowing the definition of new func-
tionalities in terms of existing ones, a hierarchy is created which improves usability, 
manageability and scalability. While end users can simply assign policies based upon 
high-level functionalities, security administrators and analysts can study policy con-
struction at multiple levels. The separation of duty mechanism also ensures that high 
level policy goals are maintained during the construction of low-level policies. Fi-
nally, the use of parameterisation allows confinement policies to be easily adapted to 
deal with subtle differences between similar applications and this further improves 
policy reusability. As demonstrated by the four web browser policies presented, the 
usability and management improvements provided by FBAC make deploying applica-
tion confinement significantly easier and could therefore have the potential to encour-
age broader adoption of such security mechanisms in the future. 
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 Appendix A: FBAC-LSM Policies for Popular Web Browsers  
application lynx 
{ 
    binarypaths /usr/bin/lynx:/usr/bin/X11/lynx; 
    functionality Standard_Commandline_Application 
        (peruser_directory="", 
        peruser_files="", 
        application_so_libraries_directory="", 
        libraries_fileextension="", 
        config_directory="", 
        config_files={"/etc/lynx.cfg":"/etc/lynx.lss"}, 
        read_only_config_directory=""); 
    functionality Web_Browser 
        (plugins_and_extensions_directory="", 
        download_directory="/home/*/downloads/", 
        allowed_hosts_to_connect_to="*", 
        view_web_files_in_directory="/home/**/"); 
    functionality user_login_awareness ( ); 
    functionality requires_tmp_access ( ); 
} 
application epiphany 
{ 
    binarypaths /usr/bin/epiphany:/usr/bin/X11/epiphany; 
    functionality Standard_Graphical_Application 
        (peruser_directory="/home/*/.gnome2/epiphany/", 
        peruser_files="/home/*/.gnome2/accels/epiphany", 
        application_libraries_directory="/usr/lib/epiphany/", 
        libraries_fileextension="*", 
        config_directory="/home/*/.gnome2_private/", 
        config_files={"/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/profiles.ini": 
            "/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/*/prefs.js"}, 
        read_only_directory="/usr/share/epiphany/"); 
    functionality Web_Browser 
        (plugins_and_extensions_directory="/usr/share/epiphany-extensions/", 
        download_directory="/home/*/downloads/", 
        allowed_hosts_to_connect_to="*", 
        view_web_files_in_directory="/home/**/"); 
    functionality register_as_mozplugger_plugin ( ); 
} 
application opera 
{ 
    binarypaths /usr/bin/opera:/usr/bin/X11/opera; 
    functionality Standard_Graphical_Application  
        (peruser_directory="/home/*/.opera/", 
        peruser_files="", 
        application_libraries_directory="/usr/lib/opera/", 
        libraries_fileextension="*", 
        config_directory="/home/*/.kde/share/config/", 
        config_files={"/etc/opera6rc":"/etc/opera6rc.fixed"}, 
        read_only_directory="/usr/share/opera/"); 
    functionality Web_Browser 
        (plugins_and_extensions_directory={"/usr/lib/opera/plugins/": 
        "/usr/lib/browser-plugins/":"/usr/lib/firefox/plugins/"}, 
        download_directory={"/home/*/OperaDownloads/": 
        "/home/*/downloads/"}, 
        allowed_hosts_to_connect_to="*", 
        view_web_files_in_directory="/home/**/"); 
    functionality Email_Client  
        (mail_out_SMTP_servers="my.mail.server.com", 
        SMTP_remote_port=<default>, 
        mail_in_POP3_servers="*", 
        POP3_remote_port=<default>, 
        mail_in_IMAP_servers="*", 
        IMAP_remote_port=<default>); 
    functionality Irc_Chat_Client  
        (chat_IRC_servers=<default>, 
        IRC_remote_port=<default>); 
    functionality News_Reader_Client (news_NNTP_servers=<default>); 
    functionality BitTorrent_Client  
        (bittorrent_peers_and_trackers="*", 
        bittorrent_remote_port="18768"); 
} 